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Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Games with
Asymmetric Information-Part 1: Finite Games
Ashutosh Nayyar, Abhishek Gupta, Cédric Langbort and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state
of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes
is considered. The asymmetry of information among the controllers makes it difficult to compute
or characterize Nash equilibria. Using common information among the controllers, the game with
asymmetric information is shown to be equivalent to another game with symmetric information. Further,
under certain conditions, a Markov state is identified for the equivalent symmetric information game
and its Markov perfect equilibria are characterized. This characterization provides a backward induction
algorithm to find Nash equilibria of the original game with asymmetric information in pure or behavioral
strategies. Each step of this algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one-stage Bayesian
game. The class of Nash equilibria of the original game that can be characterized in this backward manner
are named common information based Markov perfect equilibria.
Index Terms
Stochastic Games, Nash equilibrium, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Backward Induction
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic games model situations where multiple players jointly control the evolution of
the state of a stochastic dynamic system with each player trying to minimize its own costs.
Stochastic games where all players have perfect state observation are well-studied [1]–[5]. In
such games, the symmetry of information among players implies that they all share the same
uncertainty about the future states and future payoffs. However, a number of games arising in
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2communication systems, queuing systems, economics, and in models of adversarial interactions
in control and communication systems involve players with different information about the state
and action processes. Due to the asymmetry of information, the players have different beliefs
about the current state and different uncertainties about future states and payoffs. As a result, the
analytical tools for finding Nash equilibria for stochastic games with perfect state observation
cannot be directly employed for games with asymmetric information.
In the absence of a general framework for stochastic games with asymmetric information,
several special models have been studied in the literature. In particular, zero-sum differential
games with linear dynamics and quadratic payoffs where the two players have different obser-
vation processes were studied in [6], [7], [8]. A zero sum differential game where one player’s
observation at any time includes the other player’s observation was considered in [9]. A zero-
sum differential game where one player has a noisy observation of the state while the other
controller has no observation of the state was considered in [10]. Discrete-time non-zero sum
LQG games with one step delayed sharing of observations were studied in [11], [12]. A one-step
delay observation and action sharing game was considered in [13]. A two-player finite game in
which the players do not obtain each other’s observations and control actions was considered
in [14] and a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium in terms of two coupled
dynamic programs was presented.
Obtaining equilibrium solutions for stochastic games when players make independent noisy
observations of the state and do not share all of their information (or even when they have
access to the same noisy observation as in [15]) has remained a challenging problem for general
classes of games. Identifying classes of game structures which would lead to tractable solutions
or feasible solution methods is therefore an important goal in that area. In this paper, we identify
one such class of nonzero-sum stochastic games, and obtain characterization of a class of Nash
equilibrium strategies.
In stochastic games with perfect state observation, a subclass of Nash equilibria - namely
the Markov perfect equilibria- can be obtained by backward induction. The advantage of this
technique is that instead of searching for equilibrium in the (large) space of strategies, we only
need to find Nash equilibrium in a succession of static games of complete information.
Can a backward inductive decomposition be extended to games of asymmetric information?
The general answer to this question is negative. However, we show that there is a class of
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3asymmetric information games that are amenable to such a decomposition. The basic concep-
tual observation underlying our results is the following: the essential impediment to applying
backward induction in asymmetric information games is the fact that a player’s posterior beliefs
about the system state and about other players’ information may depend on the strategies used
by the players in the past. If the nature of system dynamics and the information structure of
the game ensures that the players’ posterior beliefs are strategy independent, then a backward
induction argument is feasible. We formalize this conceptual argument in this paper.
We first use the common information among the controllers to show that the game with
asymmetric information is equivalent to another game with symmetric information. Further, under
the assumption of strategy independence of posterior beliefs, we identify a Markov state for the
equivalent symmetric information game and characterize its Markov perfect equilibria using
backward induction arguments. This characterization provides a backward induction algorithm
to find Nash equilibria of the original game with asymmetric information. Each step of this
algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one-stage Bayesian game. The class
of Nash equilibria of the original game that can be characterized in this backward manner are
named common information based Markov perfect equilibria. For notational convenience, we
consider games with only two controllers. Our results extend to games with n > 2 controllers
in a straightforward manner.
Our work is conceptually similar to the work in [16]. The authors in [16] considered a model
of finite stochastic game with discounted infinite-horizon cost function where each player has a
privately observed state. Under the assumption that player i’s belief about other players’ states
depends only the current state of player i and does not depend on player i’s strategy, [16]
presented a recursive algorithm to compute Nash equilibrium. Both our model and our main
assumptions differ from those in [16].
A. Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters; their realizations by the corresponding
lower case letters. Random vectors are denoted by upper case bold letters and their realizations by
lower case bold letters. Unless otherwise stated, the state, action and observations are assumed
to be vector valued. Subscripts are used as time index. Xa:b is a short hand for the vector
(Xa,Xa+1, . . . ,Xb), if a > b, then Xa:b is empty. P(·) is the probability of an event, E(·) is the
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4expectation of a random variable. For a collection of functions g, Pg(·) and Eg(·) denote that
the probability/expectation depends on the choice of functions in g. Similarly, for a probability
distribution pi, Epi(·) denotes that the expectation is with respect to the distribution pi. The notation
1{a=b} denotes 1 if the equality in the subscript is true and 0 otherwise. For a finite set A, ∆(A)
is the set of all probability mass functions over A. For two random variables (or random vectors)
X and Y , P(X = x|Y ) denotes the conditional probability of the event {X = x} given Y . This
is a random variable whose realization depends on the realization of Y .
When dealing with collections of random variables, we will at times treat the collection as a
random vector of appropriate dimension. At other times, it will be convenient to think of different
collections of random variables as sets on which one can define the usual set operations. For
example consider random vectors A = (A1, A2, A3) and A˜ = (A1, A2). Then, treating A and A˜
as sets would allow us to write A \ A˜ = {A3}.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present our model of a stochastic game
with asymmetric information in Section II. We present several special cases of our model in
Section III. We prove our main results in Section IV. We extend our arguments to consider
behavioral strategies in Section V. We examine the importance of our assumptions in Section VI.
Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. THE BASIC GAME G1
A. The Primitive Random Variables and the Dynamic System
We consider a collection of finitely-valued, mutually independent random vectors (X1,W01,
W02, . . . ,W
0
T−1, W
1
1,W
1
2, . . . ,W
1
T ,W
2
1,W
2
2, . . . ,W
2
T ) with known probability mass functions.
These random variables are called the primitive random variables.
We consider a discrete-time dynamic system with 2 controllers. For any time t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
Xt ∈ Xt denotes the state of the system at time t, Uit ∈ U it denotes the control action of
controller i, i = 1, 2 at time t. The state of the system evolves according to
Xt+1 = ft(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,W
0
t ). (1)
There are two observation processes: Y1t ∈ Y1t ,Y2t ∈ Y2t , where
Yit = h
i
t(Xt,W
i
t), i = 1, 2. (2)
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5B. The Data Available to Controllers
At any time t, the vector Iit denotes the total data available to controller i at time t. The
vector Iit is a subset of the collection of potential observables of the system at time t, that
is, Iit ⊂ {Y11:t,Y21:t,U11:t−1,U21:t−1}. We divide the total data into two components: private
information Pit and common information Ct. Thus, Iit = (Pit,Ct). As their names suggest, the
common information is available to both controllers whereas private information is available
only to one controller. Clearly, this separation of information into private and common part can
always be done. In some cases, common or private information may even be empty. For example,
if I1t = I2t = {Y11:t,Y21:t,U11:t−1,U21:t−1}, that is if both controllers have access to all observations
and actions, then Ct = I1t = I2t and P1t = P2t = ∅. On the other hand, if Iit = Yi1:t, for i = 1, 2,
then Ct = ∅ and Pit = Iit. Games where are all information is common to both controllers are
referred to as symmetric information games.
We denote the set of possible realizations of Pit as P it and the set of possible realizations of
Ct as Ct. Controller i chooses action Uit as a function of the total data (Pit,Ct) available to it.
Specifically, for each controller i,
Uit = g
i
t(P
i
t,Ct), (3)
where git, referred to as the control law at time t, can be any function of private and common
information. The collection gi = (gi1, . . . , giT ) is called the control strategy of controller i and
the pair of control strategies for the two controllers (g1, g2) is called a strategy profile. For a
given strategy profile, the overall cost of controller i is given as
J i(g1, g2) := E
[ T∑
t=1
ci(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )
]
, (4)
where the expectation on the right hand side of (4) is with respect to the probability measure on
the state and action processes induced by the choice of strategies g1, g2 on the left hand side of
(4). A strategy profile (g1, g2) is called a Nash equilibrium if no controller can lower its total
expected cost by unilaterally changing its strategy, that is,
J1(g1, g2) ≤ J1(g˜1, g2), and J2(g1, g2) ≤ J2(g1, g˜2), (5)
for all strategies g˜1, g˜2. We refer to the above game as game G1.
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6Remark 1 The system dynamics and the observation model (that is, the functions ft, h1t , h2t in
(1) and (2)), the statistics of the primitive random variables, the information structure of the
game and the cost functions are assumed to be common knowledge among the controllers. ✷
C. Evolution of Common and Private Information
Assumption 1 We assume that the common and private information evolve over time as follows:
1) The common information Ct is increasing with time, that is, Ct ⊂ Ct+1 for all t. Let
Zt+1 = Ct+1 \ Ct be the increment in common information from time t to t + 1. Thus,
Ct+1 = {Ct,Zt+1}. Further,
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1), (6)
where ζt+1 is a fixed transformation.
2) The private information evolves according to the equation
Pit+1 = ξ
i
t+1(P
i
t,U
i
t,Y
i
t+1) (7)
where ξit+1, i = 1, 2, are fixed transformations.
Equation (6) states that the increment in common information is a function of the “new”
variables generated between t and t+1, that is, the actions taken at t and the observations made
at t + 1, and the “old” variables that were part of private information at time t. Equation (7)
implies that the evolution of private information at the two controllers is influenced by different
observations and actions.
D. Common Information Based Conditional Beliefs
A key concept in our analysis is the belief about the state and the private informations
conditioned on the common information of both controllers. Formally, at any time t, given
the control laws from time 1 to t − 1, we define the common information based conditional
belief as follows:
Πt(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ) := P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(Xt = xt,P
1
t = p
1
t ,P
2
t = p
2
t |Ct) for all xt,p1t ,p2t , (8)
where we use the superscript g11:t−1, g21:t−1 in the RHS of (8) to emphasize that the conditional
belief depends on the past control laws. Note that Πt(·, ·, ·) is a |Xt × P1t × P2t |-dimensional
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7random vector whose realization depends on the realization of Ct. A realization of Πt is denoted
by pit.
Given control laws g1t , g2t , we define the following partial functions:
Γ1t = g
1
t (·,Ct) Γ
2
t = g
2
t (·,Ct)
These partial functions are functions from the private information of a controller to its control
action. These are random functions whose realizations depend on the realization of the random
vector Ct. The following lemma describes the evolution of the common information based
conditional belief using these partial functions.
Lemma 1 Consider any choice of control laws g11:t, g21:t. Let pit be the realization of the common
information based conditional belief at time t, let ct be the realization of the common information
at time t, let γit = git(·, ct), i = 1, 2, be the corresponding realizations of the partial functions
at time t, and zt+1 be the realization of the increment in common information (see Assumption
1). Then, the realization of the conditional belief at time t + 1 is given as
pit+1 = Ft(pit, γ
1
t , γ
2
t , zt+1), (9)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the control strategies. ✷
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 states that the evolution of the conditional belief Πt is governed by the partial
functions of control laws at time t. This lemma relies on Assumption 1 made earlier about
the evolution of common and private information. We now introduce the following critical
assumption that eliminates the dependence of Πt on the control laws.
Assumption 2 (Strategy Independence of Beliefs) Consider any time t, any choice of control
laws g11:t−1, g21:t−1, and any realization of common information ct that has a non-zero probability
under g11:t−1, g21:t−1. Consider any other choice of control laws g˜11:t−1, g˜21:t−1 which also gives a
non-zero probability to ct. Then, we assume that
P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(Xt = xt,P
1
t = p
1
t ,P
2
t = p
2
t |ct) = P
g˜1
1:t−1
,g˜2
1:t−1(Xt = xt,P
1
t = p
1
t ,P
2
t = p
2
t |ct),
for all xt,p1t ,p2t .
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8Equivalently, the evolution of the common information based conditional belief described in
Lemma 1 depends only on the increment in common information, that is, (9) can be written as
pit+1 = Ft(pit, zt+1), (10)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the control strategies.
Remark 2 Assumption 2 is somewhat related to the notion of one-way separation in stochastic
control, that is, the estimation (of the state in standard stochastic control and of the state and
private information in Assumption 2) is independent of the control strategy. ✷
III. GAMES SATISFYING ASSUMPTIONS 1 AND 2
Before proceeding with further analysis, we first describe some instances of G1 where the
nature of the dynamic system and the private and common information implies that Assumptions
1 and 2 hold.
A. One-Step Delayed Information Sharing Pattern
Consider the instance of G1 where the common information at any time t is given as Ct =
{Y11:t−1,Y
2
1:t−1,U
1
1:t−1,U
2
1:t−1} and the private information is given as Pit = Yit. Thus, Zt+1 :=
Ct+1 \Ct = {Y
1
t ,Y
2
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t}. This information structure can be interpreted as the case where
all observations and actions are shared among controllers with one step delay.
Lemma 2 The game with one-step delayed sharing information pattern described above satisfies
Assumptions 1 and 2. ✷
Proof: See Appendix F1.
A special case of the above information structure is the situation where the state Xt = (X1t , X2t )
and controller i’s observation Y it = X it . A game with this information structure was considered
in [13]. It is interesting to note that Assumption 2 is not true if information is shared with delays
larger than one time step [17].
1Appendices F-J are included in the Supplementary Material section at the end of the paper.
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9B. Information Sharing with One-Directional-One-Step Delay
Similar to the one-step delay case, we consider the situation where all observations of controller
1 are available to controller 2 with no delay while the observations of controller 2 are available
to controller 1 with one-step delay. All past control actions are available to both controllers.
That is, in this case, Ct = {Y11:t,Y21:t−1,U11:t−1,U21:t−1}, Zt+1 = {Y1t+1,Y2t ,U1t ,U2t}, controller
1 has no private information and the private information of controller 2 is P2t = Y2t .
Lemma 3 The game with one-directional-one-step delayed sharing information pattern de-
scribed above satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. ✷
Proof: See Appendix G.
C. State Controlled by One Controller with Asymmetric Delay Sharing
Case A: Consider the special case of G1 where the state dynamics are controlled only by
controller 1, that is,
Xt+1 = ft(Xt,U
1
t ,W
0
t ).
Assume that the information structure is given as:
Ct = {Y
1
1:t,Y
2
1:t−d,U
1
1:t−1}, P
1
t = ∅, P
2
t = Y
2
t−d+1:t.
That is, controller 1’s observations are available to controller 2 instantly while controller 2’s
observations are available to controller 1 with a delay of d ≥ 1 time steps.
Case B: Similar to the above case, consider the situation where the state dynamics are still
controlled only by controller 1 but the information structure is:
Ct = {Y
1
1:t−1,Y
2
1:t−d,U
1
1:t−1}, P
1
t = Y
1
t , P
2
t = Y
2
t−d+1:t.
Lemma 4 The games described in Cases A and B satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. ✷
Proof: See Appendix H.
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D. An Information Structure with Global and Local States
Noiseless Observations: We now consider the information structure described in [18]. In this
example, the state Xt has three components: a global state X0t and a local state X it for each
controller. The state evolution is given by the following equation:
Xt+1 = ft(X
0
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,W
0
t ) (11)
Note that the dynamics depend on the current global state X0t but not on the current local states.
Each controller has access to the global state process X01:t and its current local state X it . In
addition, each controller knows the past actions of all controllers. Thus, the common and private
information in this case are:
Ct = {X
0
1:t,U
1
1:t−1,U
2
1:t−1}, P
i
t = {X
i
t}
It is straightforward to verify that Assumption 1 holds for this case.
For a realization {x01:t,u11:t−1,u21:t−1} of the common information, the common information
based belief in this case is given as
pit(x
0, x1, x2) = Pg
1
1:t−1,g
2
1:t−1(X0t = x
0, x1t = x
1, X2t = x
2|x01:t,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1)
= 1{x0=x0
t
}P(X
1
t = x
1, X2t = x
2|x0t:t−1,u
1
t−1,u
2
t−1) (12)
It is easy to verify that the above belief depends only on the statistics of W0t−1 and is therefore
independent of control laws. Thus, Assumption 2 also holds for this case.
Noisy Observations: We can also consider a modification of the above scenario where both
controllers have a common, noisy observation Y 0t = ht(X0t ,W 1t ) of the global state. That is,
Ct = {Y
0
1:t,U
1
1:t−1,U
2
1:t−1}, P
i
t = {X
i
t}, Zt+1 = {Y
0
t+1,U
1
t ,U
2
t}.
Lemma 5 The game with the information pattern described above satisfies Assumptions 1 and
2. ✷
Proof: See Appendix I.
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E. Uncontrolled State Process
Consider a state process whose evolution does not depend on the control actions, that is, the
system state evolves as
Xt+1 = ft(Xt,W
0
t ) (13)
Further, the common and private information evolve as follows:
1) Ct+1 = {Ct,Zt+1} and
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t ,Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1), (14)
where ζt+1 is a fixed transformation.
2) The private information evolves according to the equation
Pit+1 = ξ
i
t+1(P
i
t,Y
i
t+1) (15)
where ξit+1, i = 1, 2, are fixed transformations.
Note that while control actions do not affect the state evolution, they still affect the costs.
Lemma 6 The game G1 with an uncontrolled state process described above satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2. ✷
Proof: See Appendix J.
As an example of this case, consider the information structure where the two controllers share
their observations about an uncontrolled state process with a delay of d ≥ 1 time steps. In
this case, the common information is Ct = {Y11:t−d,Y21:t−d} and the private information is
Pit = Y
i
t−d+1:t.
F. Symmetric Information Game
Consider the case when all observations and actions are available to both controllers, that is,
I1t = I
2
t = Ct = {Y
1
1:t,Y
2
1:t,U
1
1:t−1,U
2
1:t−1} and there is no private information. The common
information based belief in this case is pit(xt) = Pg
1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(Xt = xt|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1).
pit is the same as the information state in centralized stochastic control, which is known to
be control strategy independent and which satisfies an update equation of the form required
in Assumption 2 [19]. A related case with perfect state observations is the situation where
I1t = I
2
t = X1:t.
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G. Symmetrically Observed Controlled State and Asymmetrically Observed Uncontrolled State
A combination of the previous two scenarios is the situation when the state Xt consists of two
independent components: a controlled component Xat and an uncontrolled component Xbt . Both
components are observed through noisy channels. The observations about the controlled state
as well as the past actions are common to both controllers whereas the information about the
uncontrolled state satisfies the model of Section III-E. The common information based conditional
belief can then be factored into two independent components each of which satisfies an update
equation of the form required by Assumption 2.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Our goal in this section is to show that under Assumptions 1 and 2, a class of equilibria of
the game G1 can be characterized in a backward inductive manner that resembles the backward
inductive characterization of Markov perfect equilibria of symmetric information games with
perfect state observation. However, in order to do so, we have to view our asymmetric information
game as a symmetric information game by introducing “virtual players” that make decisions
based on the common information. This section describes this change of perspective and how it
can be used to characterize a class of Nash equilibria.
We reconsider the model of game G1. We assume that controller i is replaced by a virtual
player i (VP i). The system operates as follows: At time t, the data available to each virtual
player is the common information Ct. The virtual player i selects a function Γit from P it to U it
according to a decision rule χit,
Γit = χ
i
t(Ct)
Note that under a given decision rule χit, Γit is a random function since Ct is a random vector.
We will use γit to denote a realization of Γit. We will refer to Γit as the prescription selected by
virtual player i at time t. Once the virtual player has chosen Γit, a control action Uit = Γit(Pit)
is applied to the system. χi := (χi1, χi2, . . . , χiT ) is called the strategy of the virtual player i. The
total cost of the virtual player i is given as
J i(χ1, χ2) := E
[ T∑
t=1
ci(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )
]
(16)
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where the expectation on the right hand side of (16) is with respect to the probability measure
on the state and action processes induced by the choice of strategies χ1, χ2 on the left hand side
of (16). We refer to the game among the virtual players as game G2.
Remark 3 In case there is no private information, the function Γit from P it to U it is interpreted
as simply a value in the set U it . ✷
A. Equivalence with Game G1
Theorem 1 Let (g1, g2) be a Nash equilibrium of game G1. Define χi for i = 1, 2, t =
1, 2, . . . , T as
χit(ct) := g
i
t(·, ct), (17)
for each possible realization ct of common information at time t. Then (χ1, χ2) is a Nash
equilibrium of game G2. Conversely, if (χ1, χ2) is a Nash equilibrium of game G2, then define
gi for i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, . . . , T as
git(·, ct) := χ
i
t(ct), (18)
for each possible realization ct of common information at time t. Then (g1, g2) is a Nash
equilibrium of game G1. ✷
Proof: It is clear that using (17), any controller strategy profile in game G1 can be trans-
formed to a corresponding virtual player strategy profile in game G2 without altering the behavior
of the dynamic system and in particular the values of the expected costs. If a virtual player
can reduce its costs by unilaterally deviating from χi, then such a deviation must also exist
for the corresponding controller in G1. Therefore, equilibrium of controllers’ strategies implies
equilibrium of corresponding virtual players’ strategies. The converse can be shown using similar
arguments.
The game between the virtual players is a symmetric information game since they both make
their decisions based only on the common information Ct. In the next section, we identify a
Markov state for this symmetric information game and characterize Markov perfect equilibria
for this game.
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B. Markov Perfect Equilibrium of G2
We want to establish that the common information based conditional beliefs Πt (defined in
(8)) can serve as a Markov state for the game G2. Firstly, note that because of Assumption 2,
Πt depends only on the common information Ct and since both the virtual players know the
common information, the belief Πt is common knowledge among them. The following lemma
shows that Πt evolves as a controlled Markov process.
Lemma 7 From the virtual players’ perspective, the process Πt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a controlled
Markov process with the virtual players’ prescriptions γ1t , γ2t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T as the controlling
actions, that is,
P(Πt+1|ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t) = P(Πt+1|pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t) = P(Πt+1|pit, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) (19)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Following the development in [20], we next show that if one virtual player is using a strategy
that is measurable with respect to Πt, then the other virtual player can select an optimal response
strategy measurable with respect to Πt as well.
Lemma 8 If virtual player i is using a decision strategy that selects prescriptions only as a
function of the belief Πt, that is,
Γit = ψ
i
t(Πt),
t = 1, . . . , T, then virtual player j can also choose its prescriptions only as a function of the
belief Πt without any loss of performance. ✷
Proof: See Appendix C
Lemmas 7 and 8 establish Πt as the Markov state for the game G2. We now define a Markov
perfect equilibrium for game G2.
Definition 1 A strategy profile (ψ1, ψ2) is said to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of game
G2 if (i) at each time t, the strategies select prescriptions only as a function of the common
information based belief Πt and (ii) the strategies form a Nash equilibrium for every sub-game
of G2 [3]. ✷
September 18, 2012 DRAFT
Preliminary Version – September 18, 2012
15
Given a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2, we can construct a corresponding Nash equilibrium
of game G1 using Theorem 1. We refer to the class of Nash equilibria of G1 that can be
constructed from the Markov perfect equilibria of G2 as the common information based Markov
perfect equilibria of G1.
Definition 2 A strategy profile (g1, g2) of the form Uit = git(Pit,Πt), i = 1, 2, is called a common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium for game G1 if the corresponding strategies of
game G2 defined as
ψit(pit) := g
i
t(·, pit),
form a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2. ✷
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be
a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2.
Theorem 2 Consider a strategy pair (ψ1, ψ2) such that at each time t, the strategies select
prescriptions based only on the realization of the common information based belief pit, that is,
γit = ψ
i
t(pit), i = 1, 2
A necessary and sufficient condition for (ψ1, ψ2) to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2 is
that they satisfy the following conditions:
1) For each possible realization pi of ΠT , define the value function for virtual player 1:
V 1T (pi) := min
γ˜1
E[c1(Xt,Γ
1
T (P
1
T ),Γ
2
T (P
2
T ))|ΠT = pi,Γ
1
T = γ˜
1,Γ2T = ψ
2
T (pi)] (20)
Then, ψ1T (pi) must be a minimizing γ˜1 in the definition of V 1T (pi). Similarly, define the value
function for virtual player 2:
V 2T (pi) := min
γ˜2
E[c2(Xt,Γ
1
T (P
1
T ),Γ
2
T (P
2
T ))|ΠT = pi,Γ
1
t = ψ
1
T (pi),Γ
2
T = γ˜
2] (21)
Then, ψ2T (pi) must be a minimizing γ˜2 in the definition of V 2T (pi).
2) For t = T −1, . . . , 1 and for each possible realization pi of Πt, define recursively the value
functions for virtual player 1:
V 1t (pi) := min
γ˜1
E[c1(Xt,Γ
1
t (P
1
t ),Γ
2
t (P
2
t )) + V
1
t+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi,Γ
1
t = γ˜
1,Γ2t = ψ
2
t (pi)]
(22)
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where Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Zt+1). Then, ψ1t (pi) must be a minimizing γ˜1 in the definition of
V 1t (pi). Similarly, define recursively the value functions for virtual player 2:
V 2t (pi) := min
γ˜2
E[c2(Xt,Γ
1
t (P
1
t ),Γ
2(P2t )) + V
2
t+1(Πt+1)|Πt = pi,Γ
1
t = ψ
1
t (pi),Γ
2
t = γ˜
2]
(23)
where Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Zt+1). Then, ψ2t (pi) must be a minimizing γ˜2 in the definition of
V 2t (pi). ✷
Proof: See Appendix D
Theorem 2 suggest that one could follow a backward inductive procedure to find equilibrium
strategies for the virtual players. Before describing this backward procedure in detail, we make
a simple but useful observation. In (20)-(23), since the γ˜i enters the expectation only as γ˜i(Pi),
it suggests that we may be able to carry out the minimization over γ˜i by separately minimizing
over γ˜i(pi) for all possible pi. This observation leads us to the backward induction procedure
described in the next section.
Remark 4 Note that if Assumption 2 were not true, then according to Lemma 1, Πt+1 =
Ft(Πt,Γ
1
t ,Γ
2
t ,Zt+1). In this case, the entire prescription γ˜i will affect the second term in the
expectation in (22)-(23), and we could not hope to carry out the minimization over γ˜i by
separately minimizing over γ˜i(pi) for all possible pi. ✷
C. Backward Induction Algorithm for Finding Equilibrium
We can now describe a backward inductive procedure to find a Markov perfect equilibrium
of game G2 using a sequence of one-stage Bayesian games. We proceed as follows:
Algorithm 1:
1) At the terminal time T , for each realization pi of the common information based belief at
time T , we define a one-stage Bayesian game SGT (pi) where
a) The probability distribution on (XT ,P1T ,P2T ) is pi.
b) Agent2 i observes PiT and chooses action UiT , i = 1, 2.
2Agent i can be thought to be the same as controller i. We use a different name here in order to maintain the distinction
between games G1 and SGT (pi).
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c) Agent i’s cost is ci(XT ,U1T ,U2T ), i = 1, 2.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γi, i = 1, 2, for the agents
which map their observation PiT to their action UiT such that for any realization pi, γi(pi)
is a solution of the minimization problem
min
ui
E
pi[ci(XT ,u
i, γj(PjT ))|P
i
T = p
i],
where j 6= i and the superscript pi denotes that the expectation is with respect to the
distribution pi. (See [21], [22] for a definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.) If a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗ of SGT (pi) exists, denote the corresponding expected equilibrium
costs as V iT (pi), i = 1, 2 and define ψiT (pi) := γi∗, i = 1, 2.
2) At time t < T , for each realization pi of the common information based belief at time t,
we define the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(pi) where
a) The probability distribution on (Xt,P1t ,P2t ) is pi.
b) Agent i observes Pit and chooses action Uit, i = 1, 2.
c) Agent i’s cost is ci(Xt,U1t ,U2t ) + V it+1(Ft(pi,Zt+1)), i = 1, 2.
Recall that the belief for the next time step is Πt+1 = Ft(pi,Zt+1) and Zt+1 is given by
(6). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γi, i = 1, 2, for the
agents which map their observation Pit to their action Uit such that for any realization pi,
γi(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem
min
ui
E
pi[ci(Xt,u
i, γj(Pjt)) + V
i
t+1(Ft(pi,Zt+1))|P
i
t = p
i],
where j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2, and Zt+1 is the increment in common information generated
according to (6), (2) and (1) when control actions Uit = ui and Ujt = γj(Pjt) are used.
The expectation is with respect to the distribution pi. If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗
of SGt(pi) exists, denote the corresponding expected equilibrium costs as V it (pi), i = 1, 2
and define ψit(pi) := γi∗, i = 1, 2.
Theorem 3 The strategies ψ1, ψ2 defined by the backward induction procedure described in
Algorithm 1 form a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2. Consequently, strategies g1, g2
defined as
git(·, pit) := ψ
i
t(pit),
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i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, . . . , T form a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game
G1. ✷
Proof: To prove the result, we just need to observe that the strategies defined by the backward
induction procedure of Algorithm 1 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 and hence form a Markov
perfect equilibrium of game G2. See Appendix E for a more detailed proof.
D. An Example Illustrating Algorithm 1
We consider an example of game G1 where the (scalar) state Xt and the (scalar) control
actions U1t , U2t take value in the set {0, 1}. The state evolves as a controlled Markov chain
depending on the two control actions according to the state transition probabilities:
P
{
Xt+1 = 0
∣∣Xt = 0, U1t = U2t } = 14 ,
P
{
Xt+1 = 0
∣∣Xt = 1, U1t = U2t } = 12 ,
P
{
Xt+1 = 0
∣∣Xt = 0, U1t 6= U2t } = P{Xt+1 = 0∣∣Xt = 1, U1t 6= U2t } = 25 . (24)
The initial state is assumed to be equi-probable, i.e., P {X1 = 0} = P {X1 = 1} = 1/2. The
first controller observes the state perfectly, while the second controller observes the state through
a binary symmetric channel with probability of error 1/3. Thus,
Y 1t = Xt, Y
2
t =


Xt with probability 23 ,
1−Xt with probability 13 .
The controllers share the observations and actions with a delay of one time step. Thus, the
common information and private informations at time step t are given as
Ct = {X1:t−1, Y
2
1:t−1, U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1}, P
1
t = {Xt}, P
2
t = {Y
2
t }.
In the equivalent game with virtual players, the decision of the ith virtual player, Γit, is a function
that maps Y it := {0, 1} to U it := {0,1}.
The common information based belief for this case is the belief on (Xt, Y 2t ) given the common
information x1:t−1, y21:t−1, u11:t−1, u21:t−1, that is,
pit(x, y
2) = P
{
Xt = x, Y
2
t = y
2
∣∣x1:t−1, y21:t−1, u11:t−1, u21:t−1}
= P
{
Xt = x
∣∣xt−1, u1t−1, u2t−1}
(
2
3
1{y2=x} +
1
3
1{y2 6=x}
)
. (25)
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The above equation implies that the distribution pit is completely specified by xt−1, u1t−1, u2t−1.
That is,
pit = Ft−1(xt−1, u
1
t−1, u
2
t−1). (26)
(Note that Ft−1 is a vector-valued function whose components are given by (25) for all x, y2 ∈
{0, 1}.) The cost functions ci(x, u1, u2) for various values of state and actions are described by
the following matrices
xt = 0 xt = 1
0 1
0 1, 0 0, 1
1 0, 1 0, 0
0 1
0 0, 0 1, 1
1 0, 1 1, 0
where the rows in each matrix correspond to controller 1’s actions and the columns correspond
to controller 2’s actions. The first entry in each element of the cost matrix is controller 1’s cost
and second entry is controller 2’s cost.
Applying Algorithm 1:
We now use Algorithm 1 for a two-stage version of the game described above.
1) At the terminal time step T = 2, for a realization pi of the common information based
belief at time 2, we define a one stage game SG2(pi) where
a) The probability distribution on (X2, Y 22 ) is pi.
b) Agent 1 observes X2 and selects an action U12 ; Agent 2 observes Y 22 and selects U22 .
c) Agent i’s cost is ci(X2, U12 , U22 ), given by the matrices defined above.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ1, γ2, such that
• For x = 0, 1, γ1(x) is a solution of minu1 Epi[c1(X2, u1, γ2(Y 22 ))|X2 = x].
• For y = 0, 1, γ2(y) is a solution of minu2 Epi[c2(X2, γ1(X2), u2)|Y 22 = y].
It is easy to verify that
γ1(x) := 1, γ2(y) := 1 for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of SG2(pi). The expected equilibrium cost for agent i is
V i2 (pi) = E
pi[ci(X2, 1, 1)] =


pi(X2 = 1) for i = 1,
0 for i = 2
(27)
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where pi(X2 = 1) is the probability that X2 = 1 under the distribution pi. From the above
Bayesian equilibrium strategies, we define the virtual players’s decision rules for time
T = 2 as ψi2(pi) = γ
i
, i = 1, 2.
2) At time t = 1, since there is no common information, the common information based
belief pi1 is simply the prior belief on (X1, Y 21 ). Since the initial state is equally likely to
be 0 or 1,
pi1(x, y
2) =
1
2
(
2
3
1{y2=x} +
1
3
1{y2 6=x}
)
We define the one-stage Bayesian game SG1(pi1) where
a) The probability distribution on (X1, Y 21 ) is pi1.
b) Agent 1 observes X1 and selects an action U11 ; Agent 2 observes Y 21 and selects U21 .
c) Agent i’s cost is given by ci(X1, U11 , U21 ) + V i2 (F1(X1, U11 , U21 )), where F1, defined
by (26) and (25), gives the common information belief at time 2 as a function of
X1, U
1
1 , U
2
2 , and V i2 , defined in (27), gives the expected equilibrium cost for time 2
as a function of the common information belief at time 2.
For example, if U11 6= U21 , then (25), (26) and (27) imply V 12 (F1(X1, U11 , U21 )) = 3/5.
Similarly, if U11 = U21 , then (25), (26) and (27) imply V 12 (F1(0, U11 , U21 )) = 3/4 and
V 12 (F1(1, U
1
1 , U
2
1 )) = 1/2. Also, (27) implies that V 22 is identically 0.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies δ1, δ2 such that
• For x = 0, 1, δ1(x) is a solution of
min
u1
E
pi1 [c1(X1, u
1, δ2(Y 21 )) + V
1
2 (F1(X1, u
1, δ2(Y 21 )))|X1 = x].
• For y = 0, 1, δ2(y) is a solution of
min
u2
E
pi1 [c2(X1, δ
1(X1), u
2) + V 22 (F1(X1, δ
1(X1), u
2))|Y 21 = y].
It is easy to verify that
δ1(x) = 1− x, δ2(y) = 1− y
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of SG1(pi). The expected equilibrium costs are
V i1 (pi1) = E[c
i(X1, δ
1(X1), δ
2(Y 21 ))],
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which gives V 11 (pi1) = 47/60 and V 21 (pi1) = 1/3. From the above Bayesian equilibrium
strategies, we define the virtual players’s decision rules for time t = 1 as ψi1(pi1) = δi,
i = 1, 2.
Since we now know the equilibrium decision rules ψit, i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2 for the virtual
players, we can construct the corresponding control laws for the controllers using Theo-
rem 3. Thus, a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for the game in
this example is given by the strategies:
g11(x1, pi1) =


1 if x1 = 0,
0 if x1 = 1.
g21(y
2
1, pi1) =


1 if y21 = 0,
0 if y21 = 1.
and
g12(x2, pi2) = 1 g
2
2(y
2
2, pi2) = 1.
V. BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
The results of Theorems 2 and 3 provide sufficient conditions for a pair of strategies to
be an equilibrium of game G2. Neither of these results addresses the question of existence
of equilibrium. In particular, the result of Theorem 3 states that the (pure strategy) Bayesian
Nash equilibria of the one-stage Bayesian games SGt(pi), t = T, . . . , 1, may be used to find a
Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 and hence a common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium of G1. However, the games SGt(pi) may not have any (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
As is common in finite games, we need to allow for behavioral strategies in order to ensure
the existence of equilibria. Toward that end, we now reconsider the model of game G1. At each
time t, each controller is now allowed to select a probability distribution Dit over the (finite) set
of actions U it , i = 1, 2 according to a control law of the form:
Dit = g
i
t(P
i
t,Ct). (28)
The rest of the model is the same as in Section II. We denote the set of probability distributions
over U it by ∆(U it ).
Following exactly the same arguments as in Section IV, we can define an equivalent game
where virtual players select prescriptions that are functions from the set of private information
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P it to the set ∆(U it ) and establish the result of Theorem 1 for this case. A sufficient condition for
Markov perfect equilibrium of this game is given by Theorem 2 where γi are now interpreted
as mappings from P it to ∆(U it ) (instead of mappings from P it to U it ). Given a Markov perfect
equilibrium (ψ1, ψ2) of the virtual players’ game, the equivalent strategies git(·, pi) := ψit(pi) form
a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1 in behavioral strategies.
Further, we can follow a backward induction procedure identical to the one used in section IV-C
(Algorithm 1), but now consider mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of the one-stage
Bayesian games SGt(pi) constructed there. We proceed as follows:
Algorithm 2:
1) At the terminal time T , for each realization pi of the common information based belief at
time T , consider the one-stage Bayesian game SGT (pi) defined in Algorithm 1. A mixed
strategy γi for the game SGT (pi) is a mapping form P iT to ∆(U iT ). A mixed strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ1, γ2 such that for any
realization pi, γi(pi) assigns zero probability to any action that is not a solution of the
minimization problem
min
ui
E[ci(Xt,u
i,Ujt)|P
i
T = p
i],
where Ujt is distributed according to γj(P
j
t). Since SGt(pi) is a finite Bayesian game, a
mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [22]. For any mixed strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗ of SGT (pi), denote the expected equilibrium costs as V iT (pi) and
define ψit(pi) := γi∗, i = 1, 2.
2) At time t < T , for each realization pi of the common information based belief at time t,
consider the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(pi) defined in Algorithm 1. A mixed strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ1, γ2 such that for any
realization pi, γi(pi) assigns zero probability to any action that is not a solution of the
minimization problem
min
ui
E[ci(Xt,u
i,Ujt )) + V
i
t+1(Ft(pi,Zt+1))|P
i
t = p
i],
where Ujt is distributed according to γj(Pjt) and Zt+1 is the increment in common in-
formation generated according to (6), (2) and (1) when control actions Uit = ui and Ujt
distributed according to γj(Pjt) are used. Since SGt(pi) is a finite Bayesian game, a mixed
strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [22]. For any mixed strategy Bayesian Nash
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equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗ of SGt(pi), denote the expected equilibrium costs as V it (pi) and define
ψit(pi) := γ
i∗
, i = 1, 2.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 4 For the finite game G1, a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium in
behavioral strategies always exists. Further, this equilibrium can be found by first constructing
strategies ψ1, ψ2 according to the backward inductive procedure of Algorithm 2 and then defining
behavioral strategies g1, g2 in G1 as
git(·, pit) := ψ
i
t(pit),
i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, . . . , T . ✷
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Importance of Assumption 2
The most restrictive assumption in our analysis of game G1 is Assumption 2 which states
that the common information based belief is independent of control strategies. It is instructive to
consider why our analysis does not work in the absence of this assumption. Let us consider the
model of Section II with Assumption 1 as before but without Assumption 2. Lemma 1, which
follows from Assumption 1, is still true. For this version of game G1 without Assumption 2, we
can construct an equivalent game with virtual players similar to game G2. Further, it is easy to
show that Theorem 1 which relates equilibria of G2 to those of G1 is still true.
The key result for our analysis of game G2 in section IV was Lemma 8 which allowed us to
use pit as a Markov state and to define and characterize Markov perfect equilibria for the game
G2. Lemma 8 essentially states that the set of Markov decision strategy pairs (that is, strategies
that select prescriptions as a function of pit) is closed with respect to the best response mapping.
In other words, if we start with any pair of Markov strategies (ψ1, ψ2) for the virtual players and
define χi to be the best response of virtual player i to ψj , then, for at least one choice of best
response strategies, the pair (χ1, χ2) belongs to the set of Markov strategy pairs. This is true
not just for strategies (ψ1, ψ2) that form an equilibrium but for any choice of Markov strategies.
We will now argue that this is not necessarily true without Assumption 2.
Recall that due to Lemma 1, the belief pit evolves as
pit = Ft−1(pit−1, γ
1
t−1, γ
2
t−1, zt).
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Thus, in order to evaluate the current realization of pit, a virtual player must know the prescrip-
tions used by both virtual players. However, the virtual players do not observe each other’s past
prescriptions since the only data they have available is ct. Thus, a virtual player cannot evaluate
the belief pit without knowing (or assuming) how the other player selects its prescriptions.
Consider now decision strategies (ψ1, ψ2) for the two virtual players which operate as follows:
At each time t, the prescriptions chosen by virtual players are
γit = ψ
i
t(pit) (29)
and the belief at the next time t + 1 is
pit+1 = Ft(pit, ψ
1
t (pit), ψ
2
t (pit), zt+1). (30)
Assume that the above strategies are not a Nash equilibrium for the virtual players’ game.
Therefore, one virtual player, say virtual player 2, can benefit by deviating from its strategy.
Given that virtual player 1 continues to operate according to (29) and (30), is it possible for
virtual player 2 to reduce its cost by using a non-Markov strategy, that is, a strategy that selects
prescriptions based on more data than just pit? Consider any time t, if virtual player 2 has
deviated to some other choice of Markov decision rules ψ2∗1:t−1 in the past, then the true belief
on state and private information given the common information,
pi∗t = P
ψ1
1:t−1
,ψ2∗
1:t−1(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t |ct),
is different from the belief pit evaluated by the first player according to (30). (Note that since
past prescriptions are not observed and virtual player 1’s operation is fixed by (29) and (30),
virtual player 1 continues to use pit evolving according to (30) as its belief.) Even though pit is
no longer the true belief, virtual player 2 can still track its evolution using (30). Using arguments
similar to those in the proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8, it can be established that an optimal strategy
for virtual player 2, given that virtual player 1 operates according to (29) and (30), is of the
form γ2t = ψ2∗t (pi∗t , pit), where pi∗t is the true conditional belief on state and private information
given the common information whereas pit is given by (30). Thus, the best response of player
2 may not necessarily be a Markov strategy and hence Lemma 8 may no longer hold. Without
Lemma 8, we cannot define Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 using pit as the state.
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B. The Case of Team Problems
The game G1 is referred to as a team problem if the two controllers have the same cost
functions, that is, c1(·) = c2(·) = cteam(·). Nash equilibrium strategies can then be interpreted
as person-by-person optimal strategies [23]. Clearly, the results of sections IV and V apply to
person-by-person optimal strategies for team problems as well.
For team problems, our results can be strengthened in two ways. Firstly, we can find globally
optimal strategies for the controllers in the team using the virtual player approach and secondly,
we no longer need to make Assumption 2. Let us retrace our steps in section IV for the team
problem without Assumption 2:
1) We can once again introduce virtual players that observe the common information and
select prescriptions for the controllers. The two virtual players have the same cost function.
So game G2 is now a team problem and we will refer to it as T2 . It is straightforward
to establish that globally optimal strategies for virtual player can be translated to globally
optimal strategies for the controllers in the team in a manner identical to Theorem 1.
2) Since we are no longer making Assumption 2, the common information belief evolves
according to
pit = Ft−1(pit−1, γ
1
t−1, γ
2
t−1, zt). (31)
Virtual player 1 does not observe γ2t−1, so it cannot carry out the update described in (31).
However, we will now increase the information available to virtual players and assume
that each virtual player can indeed observe all past prescriptions γ11:t−1, γ21:t−1. We refer
to this team with expanded information for the virtual players as T2’.
It should be noted that the globally optimal expected cost for T2’ can be no larger than
the globally optimal cost of T2 since we have only added information in going from T2
to T2’. We will later show that the globally optimal strategies we find for T2’ can be
translated to equivalent strategies for T2 with the same expected cost.
3) For T2’, since all past prescriptions are observed, both virtual players can evaluate pit
using (31) without knowing the past decision rules ψ11:t−1, ψ21:t−1. We can now repeat the
arguments in the proof of Lemma 7 to show that an analogous result is true for team T2’
as well. The team problem for the virtual players is now a Markov decision problem with
pit evolving according to (31) as the Markov state and the prescription pair (γ1t , γ2t ) as the
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decision. We can then write a dynamic program for this Markov decision problem.
Theorem 5 For the team problem T2’ with virtual players, for each realization of pit, the
optimal prescriptions are the minimizers in the following dynamic program:
V teamT (pi) := min
γ˜1,γ˜2
E[cteam(Xt,Γ
1
T (P
1
T ),Γ
2
T (P
2
T ))|ΠT = pi,Γ
1
T = γ˜
1,Γ2T = γ˜
2] (32)
V teamt (pi) := min
γ˜1,γ˜2
E[cteam(Xt,Γ
1
t (P
1
t ),Γ
2
t (P
2
t )) + V
team
t+1 (Πt+1)|Πt = pi,Γ
1
t = γ˜
1,Γ2t = γ˜
2]
(33)
where Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Γ1t ,Γ2t ,Zt+1). ✷
4) Let ψ1∗t (pi) be the minimizer in the right hand side of the definition of V teamt (pi) in the
above dynamic program. The globally optimal virtual players’ operation can be described
as: At each t, evaluate
pit = Ft−1(pit−1, γ
1
t−1, γ
2
t−1, zt) (34)
and then select the prescriptions
γit = ψ
∗i
t (pit) i = 1, 2. (35)
Now, instead of operating according to (34) and (35), assume that virtual players operate
as follows: At each t, evaluate
pit = Ft−1(pit−1, ψ
∗1
t−1(pit−1), ψ
∗2
t−1(pit−1), zt) (36)
and then select the prescriptions
γit = ψ
∗i
t (pit) i = 1, 2. (37)
It should be clear that virtual players operating according to (36) and (37) will achieve the
same globally optimal performance as the virtual players operating according to (34) and
(35). Furthermore, the virtual players in T2 can follow (36) and (37) and thus achieve the
same globally optimal performance as in T2’.
Thus, to find globally optimal strategies for the team of virtual players in absence of As-
sumption 2, we first increased their information to include past prescriptions and then mapped
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the globally optimal strategies with increased information to equivalent strategies with original
information.
For the game G2 in absence of assumption 2, we cannot follow the above approach of first
increasing virtual players’ information to include past prescriptions, finding equilibrium with
added information and then mapping the equilibrium strategies to equivalent strategies with
original information. To see the reason, let us denote the virtual player operation given by (34)
and (35) by the strategy σi, i = 1, 2 and the virtual player operation given by (36) and (37) by the
strategy σˆi, i = 1, 2. Then, while it is true that J i(σ1, σ2) = J i(σˆ1, σˆ2), i = 1, 2, but for some
other strategies ρ1, ρ2, it is not necessarily true that J i(σi, ρj) = J i(σˆi, ρj), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Therefore, the equilibrium conditions for σ1, σ2:
J 1(σ1, σ2) ≤ J 1(ρ1, σ2), and J 2(σ1, σ2) ≤ J 2(σ1, ρ2), (38)
do not necessarily imply the equilibrium conditions for σˆ1, σˆ2:
J 1(σˆ1, σˆ2) ≤ J 1(ρ1, σˆ2), and J 2(σˆ1, σˆ2) ≤ J 2(σˆ1, ρ2). (39)
Remark 5 Our dynamic program for the team problem is similar to the dynamic program for
teams obtained in [24] using a slightly different but conceptually similar approach. ✷
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered the problem of finding Nash equilibria of a general model of stochastic
games with asymmetric information. Our analysis relied on the nature of common and private
information among the controllers. Crucially, we assumed that the common information among
controllers is increasing with time and that a common information based belief on the system
state and private information is independent of control strategies. Under these assumptions, the
game with asymmetric information is shown to be equivalent to another game with symmetric
information for which we obtained a characterization of Markov perfect equilibria. This charac-
terization allowed us to provide a backward induction algorithm to find Nash equilibria of the
original game. Each step of this algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one-
stage Bayesian game. The class of Nash equilibria of the original game that can be characterized
in this backward manner are named common information based Markov perfect equilibria.
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The class of common information based Markov perfect equilibria for asymmetric information
games bears conceptual similarities with Markov perfect equilibria of symmetric information
games with perfect state observation. In symmetric information games with perfect state obser-
vation, a controller may be using past state information only because the other controller is using
that information. Therefore, if one controller restricts to Markov strategies, the other controller
can do the same. This observation provides the justification for focusing only on Markov perfect
equilibria for such games. Our results show that a similar observation can be made in our model
of games with asymmetric information. A controller may be using the entire common information
only because other controller is using that information. If one controller chooses to only use the
common information based belief on the state and private information, the other controller can
do the same. Thus, it is reasonable to focus on the class of common information based Markov
perfect equilibria for our model of games with asymmetric information.
Further, for zero-sum games, the uniqueness of the value of the game implies that the equi-
librium cost of a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium is the same as the
equilibrium cost of any other Nash equilibrium [21].
For finite games, it is always possible to find pure strategy Nash equilibria (if they exist) by
a brute force search of the set of possible strategy profiles. The number of strategy choices for
controller i are |U i1||P
i
1
×C1| × . . . × |U iT |
|Pi
T
×CT |
. For simplicity, assume that the set of possible
realizations of private information P it does not change with time. However, because the common
information is required to be increasing with time (see Assumption 1), the cardinality of the set
possible realization of common information Ct is exponentially increasing with time. Thus, the
number of possible control strategies exhibits a double exponential growth with time.
Algorithm 1 provides an alternative way for finding an equilibrium by solving a succession
of one stage Bayesian games. But how many such games need to solved? At each time t, we
need to solve a Bayesian game for each possible realization of the belief pit. Let Rt denote the
set of possible realizations of the belief pit. Since the belief is simply a function of the common
information, we must have that |Rt| ≤ |Ct|. Thus, the total number of one stage games that need
to solved is no larger that
∑T
t=1 |Ct|. Recalling the exponential growth of |Ct|, the number of
one-stage games to solve shows an exponential growth with time. This is clearly better than the
double exponential growth for the brute force search.
Two possible reasons may further reduce the complexity of Algorithm 1. Firstly, the set |Rt|
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may not be growing exponentially with time (as in the case of the information structure in
Section IV-D, where |Rt| = 3, for all t > 1). Secondly, the one-stage games at time t, SGt(pi)
may possess enough structure that it is possible to find an equilibrium for a generic pi that can be
used to construct equilibrium for all choices of pi. For finite games, it is not clear what additional
features need to be present in game G1 such that the resulting one-stage games SGt(pi) can be
solved for a generic pi. In the sequel to this paper we will extend the approach used here to linear
quadratic Gaussian games and show that in these games it is possible to solve the one-stage
games for a generic belief pi.
Conceptually, the approach adopted in this paper can be extended to infinite time horizon
games with discounted costs under suitable stationarity conditions. However, in infinite horizon
games, the number of possible realizations of the common information based belief would, in
general, be infinite. Establishing the existence of common information based Markov perfect
equilibria for infinite horizon games would be an interesting direction for future work in this
area.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider a realization ct of the common information Ct at time t. Let γ1t , γ2t be the corre-
sponding realization of the partial functions of the control laws at time t, that is, γit = git(·, ct).
Given the realization of the common information based belief pit and the partial functions γ1t , γ2t ,
we can find the joint conditional distribution on (Xt,P1t ,P2t ,Xt+1,P1t+1,P2t+1,Zt+1) conditioned
on the common information at time t as follows:
P
g11:t,g
2
1:t(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ,xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1|ct)
=
∑
y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
,u1
t
,u2
t
P
g1
1:t
,g2
1:t(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ,xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1,y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1,u
1
t ,u
2
t |ct)
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=
∑
y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
,u1
t
,u2
t
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p
2
t
,u1
t
,u2
t
,y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
)=zt+1}1{ξ1t+1(p
1
t
,u1
t
,y1
t+1
)=p1
t+1
}1{ξ2
t+1
(p2
t
,u2
t
,y2
t+1
)=p2
t+1
}
P(y1t+1,y
2
t+1|xt+1)P(xt+1|xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )1{γ1t (p1t )=u1t }1{γ2t (p2t )=u2t }pit(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ) (40)
Note that in addition to the arguments on the left side of conditioning in (40), we only need
pit and γ1t , γ2t to evaluate the right hand side of (40). That is, the joint conditional distribution
on (Xt,P
1
t ,P
2
t ,Xt+1,P
1
t+1,P
2
t+1,Zt+1) depends only on pit, γ1t and γ2t with no dependence on
control strategies.
We can now consider the common information based belief at time t+ 1,
pit+1(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1) = P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1|ct+1)
= P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1|ct, zt+1)
=
P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1|ct)
P(zt+1|ct)
(41)
The numerator and denominator of (41) are both marginals of the probability in (40). Using (40)
in (41), gives pit+1 as a function of pit, γ1t , γ2t , zt+1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Consider a realization ct of common information at time t and realizations pi1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t of
beliefs and prescriptions till time t. Because of (10) in Assumption 2, we have
Πt+1 = Ft(pit,Zt+1)
Hence, in order to establish the lemma, it suffices to show that
P(Zt+1|ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t) = P(Zt+1|pit, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) (42)
Recall that
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1)
= ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t , γ
1
t (P
1
t ), γ
2
t (P
2
t ),Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1) (43)
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where we used the fact that the control actions are simply the prescriptions evaluated at the
private information. Therefore,
P(Zt+1 = z|ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t)
=
∑
xt,xt+1,y
1
t+1
,y2
t+1
,p1
t
,p2
t
P(Zt+1 = z,xt,xt+1,y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1,p
1
t ,p
2
t |ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t)
=
∑
xt,y
1
t+1
,y2
t+1
,p1
t
,p2
t
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p
2
t
,γ1
t
(p1
t
),γ2
t
(p2
t
),y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
)=z}P(y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1|xt+1)
× P(xt+1|xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t ))P(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t |ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t)
=
∑
xt,y
1
t+1
,y2
t+1
,p1
t
,p2
t
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p
2
t
,γ1
t
(p1
t
),γ2
t
(p2
t
),y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
)=z}P(y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1|xt+1)
× P(xt+1|xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t ))pit(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ), (44)
where we used the fact that P(xt,p1t ,p2t |ct, pi1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t) = P(xt,p1t ,p2t |ct), since pi1:t, γ11:t, γ21:t
are all functions of ct, and the fact that P(xt,p1t ,p2t |ct) =: pit(xt,p1t ,p2t ). The right hand side in
(44) depends only on pit and γ1t , γ2t . Thus, the conditional probability of Zt+1 = z conditioned
on ct, pi1:t, γ
1
1:t, γ
2
1:t depends only on pit and γ1t , γ2t . This establishes (42) and hence the lemma.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Assume that virtual player 1 is using a fixed strategy of the form Γ1t = ψ1t (Πt), t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
We now want to find a strategy of virtual player 2 that is a best response to the given strategy
of virtual player 1. Lemma 7 established that Πt is a controlled Markov process with the
prescriptions Γ1t ,Γ2t as the controlling actions. Since Γ1t has been fixed to ψ1t (Πt), it follows
that, under the fixed strategy of virtual player 1, Πt can be viewed as a controlled Markov
process with the decisions of virtual player 2, Γ2t as the controlling action.
At time t, if ct is the realization of common information, pit is the corresponding realization
of the common information belief, then γ1t = ψ1t (pit) is prescription selected by virtual player 1.
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If virtual player 2 selects γ2t , the expected instantaneous cost for the virtual player 2 is
E[c2(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )|ct] = E[c
2(Xt, γ
1
t (P
1
t ), γ
2
t (P
2
t ))|ct]
=
∑
xt,p
1
t
,p2
t
c2(xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t ))P(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t |ct)
=
∑
xt,p
1
t
,p2
t
c2(xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t ))pit(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ) =: c˜
2(pit, γ
2
t ) (45)
Thus, given the fixed strategy of virtual player 1, the instantaneous expected cost for virtual
player 2 depends only on the belief pit and the prescription selected by virtual player 2. Given
the controlled Markov nature of pit, it follows that virtual player 2’s optimization problem is a
Markov decision problem with Πt as the state and hence virtual player 2 can optimal select its
prescription as a function of Πt. This completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider a strategy pair (ψ1, ψ2) that satisfies the conditions of the theorem. For any 1 ≤
k ≤ T and any realization ck of the common information at time k, we want to show that the
strategies form a Nash equilibrium of the sub-game starting from time k with the costs given as
E
[ T∑
t=k
ci(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )|ck
]
, (46)
i = 1, 2. If the strategy of player j is fixed to ψjt , t = k, k+1, . . . , T , then by arguments similar
to those in the proof of Lemma 8, the optimization problem for player i starting from time k
onwards with the objective given by (46) is a Markov decision problem which we denote by
MDP ik. Since ψit, t = k, k + 1, . . . , T, satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 for player i, they
satisfy the dynamic programming conditions of MDP ik. Thus, ψit, t = k, k + 1, . . . , T, is the
best response to ψj, t = k, k+1, . . . , T, in the sub-game starting from time k. Interchanging the
roles of i and j implies that the strategies ψ1t , ψ2t , t = k, k + 1, . . . , T, form an equilibrium of
the sub-game starting from time k. Since k was arbitrary, this completes the proof of sufficiency
part of the theorem. The converse follows a similar MDP based argument.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Consider any realization pi of the common information based belief and consider a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗ of the game SGT (pi). We will show that γ1∗, γ2∗ satisfy the value
function conditions for time T in Theorem 2. By definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for
every realization p1 of P1T ,
E
pi[c1(XT , γ
1∗(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))|P
1
T = p
1] ≤ Epi[c1(XT , γ˜
1(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))|P
1
T = p
1], (47)
for any choice of γ˜1. Averaging over p1, we get
E
pi
[
E[c1(XT , γ
1∗(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))|P
1
T ]
]
≤ Epi
[
E[c1(XT , γ˜
1(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))|P
1
T ]
]
=⇒ Epi[c1(XT , γ
1∗(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))] ≤ E
pi[c1(XT , γ˜
1(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))], (48)
where all the expectations are with respect to the belief pi on (XT ,P1T ,P2T ). Similarly,
E
pi[c2(XT , γ
1∗(P1T ), γ
2∗(P2T ))] ≤ E
pi[c2(XT , γ
1∗(P1T ), γ˜
2(P2T ))], (49)
for any choice of γ˜2. Thus, ψiT (pi) := γi∗, i = 1, 2 satisfy the conditions in (20) and (21) when
ΠT = pi.
Similarly, for any time t < T , consider any realization pi of the common information based
belief at t and consider a Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ1∗, γ2∗ of the game SGt(pi). Then, by
definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for every realization p1 and any choice of γ˜1, we have
that the expression
E
pi[c1(Xt, γ
1∗(Pit), γ
2∗(P2t )) + V
1
t+1(Ft(pi,Zt+1))|P
1
t = p
1],
(where Zt+1 is the increment in common information generated according to (6), (2) and (1)
when control actions U1t = γ1∗(pi) and U2t = γ2∗(P2∗t ) are used) can be no larger than
E
pi[c1(Xt, γ˜
1(Pit), γ
2∗(P2t )) + V
1
t+1(Ft(pi,Zt+1))|P
1
t = p
1],
(where Zt+1 is the increment in common information generated according to (6), (2) and (1)
when control actions U1t = γ˜1(pi) and U2t = γ2∗(P2∗t ) are used. Similar conditions hold for
player 2. Averaging over p1,p2, establishes that ψit(pi) := γi∗, i = 1, 2 satisfy the conditions in
(22) and (23) when Πt = pi.
Thus, the strategies ψi, i = 1, 2 defined by the backward induction procedure of Algorithm 1
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2 and hence form a Markov perfect equilibrium for game G2.
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Supplementary Material
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that the structure of common and private information
satisfies Assumption 1. We focus on the proof for Assumption 2. For a realization y11:t,y21:t,u11:t,u21:t
of the common information at time t + 1, the common information based belief can be written
as
pit+1(xt+1,y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1) = P
g1
1:t
,g2
1:t(Xt+1 = xt+1,Y
1
t+1 = y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1 = y
2
t+1|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
= P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)P(Y
2
t+1 = y
2
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)
× Pg
1
1:t
,g2
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2
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1
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2
t+1 = y
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×
∑
xt
[
P(Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )P
g11:t,g
2
1:t(Xt = xt|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
]
, (50)
where we used the dynamics and observation model to get the expression in (50). It can now be
argued that in the last term in (50), we can remove the terms u1t ,u2t in the conditioning since
they are functions of the rest of terms y11:t,y21:t,u11:t−1,u21:t−1 in the conditioning. The last term
in (50) would then be
P
g11:t,g
2
1:t(Xt = xt|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1),
which is known to be independent of choice of control laws g11:t, g21:t [19]. Thus, pit+1 is inde-
pendent of the choice of control laws. For the sake of completeness, we provide a more detailed
argument below.
The last term in (50) can be written as
P
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,g2
1:t(Xt = xt|y
1
1:t,y
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1
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2
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(51)
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Combining (50) and (51) establishes that pit+1 is a function only of pit and zt+1 = (y1t ,y2t ,u1t ,u2t ).
Further, the transformation form (pit, zt+1) to pit+1 does not depend on the choice of control
strategies.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that the structure of common and private information
satisfies Assumption 1. We focus on the proof for Assumption 2. For a realization y11:t+1,y21:t,
u11:t,u
2
1:t of the common information at time t+1, the common information based belief can be
written as
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(52)
The numerator in the second term in (52) can be written as
P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)P
g11:t,g
2
1:t(Xt+1 = xt+1|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
= P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)×∑
xt
[
P(Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )P
g11:t,g
2
1:t(Xt = xt|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1)
]
= P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)×
∑
xt
[
P(Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )
P
g1
1:t
,g2
1:t(Xt = xt,y
2
t |y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t−1,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1)
Pg
1
1:t
,g2
1:t(y2t |y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t−1,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1)
]
= P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)
∑
xt
[
P(Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )
pit(xt,y
2
t )
pit(y
2
t )
]
(53)
Similar expressions can be obtained for the denominator of the second term in (52) to get
pit+1(xt+1,y
2
t+1) = P(Y
2
t+1 = y
2
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)×
P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = xt+1)
∑
xt
[
P(Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )pit(xt,y
2
t )
]
P(Y1t+1 = y
1
t+1|Xt+1 = x)
∑
x′
t
[
P(Xt+1 = x|Xt = x′t,u
1
t ,u
2
t )pit(x
′
t,y
2
t )
]
=: Ft(pit,y
1
t+1,y
2
t ,u
1
t ,u
2
t ) = Ft(pit, zt+1) (54)
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Assumption 1 is clearly satisfied. We focus on Assumption 2. Case A: For a realization
y11:t,y
2
1:t−d,u
1
1:t−1 of the common information, the common information based belief in this case
can be written as:
pit(xt,y
2
t−d+1:t) = P
g11:t−1(Xt = xt,Y
2
t−d+1:t = y
2
t−d+1:t|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t−d,u
1
1:t−1)
=
∑
x′
t−d:t−1
[
P(Y2t−d+1:t = y
2
t−d+1:t|Xt−d+1:t−1 = x
′
t−d+1:t−1,Xt = xt)
·Pg
1
1:t−1(Xt = xt,Xt−d:t−1 = x
′
t−d:t−1|y
1
1:t,y
2
1:t−d,u
1
1:t−1)
]
(55)
The first term in (55) depends only on the noise statistics. To see how the second term in
(55) is strategy independent, consider a centralized stochastic control problem with controller
1 as the only controller where the state process is X˜t := (Xt−d:t), the observation process is
Y˜t := (Y
1
t ,Y
2
t−d). The second term in (55) is simply the information state P(X˜t|y˜1:t,u11:t−1)
of this centralized stochastic control problem which is known to be strategy independent and
satisfies an update equation of the form required by Lemma 4 [19].
Case B: Using arguments similar to those in Case A, the common information based belief
pit for a realization y11:t−1,y21:t−d,u11:t−1 of the common information can be written as:
pit(xt,y
1
t ,y
2
t−d+1:t) =
∑
x′
t−d:t−1
[
P(Y1t = y
1
t ,Y
2
t−d+1:t = y
2
t−d+1:t|Xt−d+1:t−1 = x
′
t−d+1:t−1,Xt = xt)
· Pg
1
1:t−1(Xt = xt,Xt−d:t−1 = x
′
t−d:t−1|y
1
1:t−1,y
2
1:t−d,u
1
1:t−1)
]
(56)
The second term in (56) is
P(y2t−d|xt−d)P
g11:t−1(Xt = xt,Xt−d:t−1 = x
′
t−d:t−1|y
1
1:t−1,y
2
1:t−d−1,u
1
1:t−1)
P
g1
1:t−1(Y2t−d = y
2
t−d|y
1
1:t−1,y
2
1:t−d−1,u
1
1:t−1)
(57)
Both the numerator and the denominator can be shown to be strategy independent using the
transformation to centralized stochastic control problem described in case A.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
For a realization y01:t+1,u11:t,u21:t of the common information at time t + 1, the belief pit+1 is
given as
pit+1(x
0, x1, x2) = Pg
1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2|y01:t+1,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t) (58)
=
P
g11:t−1,g
2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2, Y 0t+1 = y
0
t+1|y
0
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(Y 0t+1 = y
0
t+1|y
0
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
=
P(Y 0t+1 = y
0
t+1|X
0
t+1 = x
0
t+1)P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2|y01:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)∑
xP(Y
0
t+1 = y
0
t+1|X
0
t+1 = x)P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x|y
0
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
(59)
The control strategy dependent term in the numerator in (59) can be written as
P
g11:t−1,g
2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2|y01:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t)
=
∑
x′
[
P(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2|X0t = x
′,u1t ,u
2
t )
· Pg
1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(X0t = x
′|y01:t,u
1
1:t−1,u
2
1:t−1)
]
=
∑
x′
P(X0t+1 = x
0, X1t+1 = x
1, X2t+1 = x
2|X0t = x
′,u1t ,u
2
t )pit(x
′) (60)
Similarly, the control strategy dependent term in the denominator in (59) can be written as
P
g1
1:t−1
,g2
1:t−1(X0t+1 = x|y
0
1:t,u
1
1:t,u
2
1:t) =
∑
x′′
P(X0t+1 = x|X
0
t = x
′′,u1t ,u
2
t )pit(x
′′) (61)
Substituting (60) and (61) in (59) establishes the lemma.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Consider a realization ct of the common information Ct at time t. Given the realization
of the common information based belief pit, we can find the joint conditional distribution
on (Xt,P
1
t ,P
2
t ,Xt+1,P
1
t+1,P
2
t+1,Zt+1) conditioned on the common information at time t as
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follows:
P(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ,xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1|ct)
=
∑
y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
P(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t ,xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1,y
1
t+1,y
2
t+1|ct)
=
∑
y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
[
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p
2
t
,y1
t+1
,y2
t+1
)=zt+1}1{ξ1t+1(p
1
t
,y1
t+1
)=p1
t+1
}1{ξ2
t+1
(p2
t
,y2
t+1
)=p2
t+1
}
× P(y1t+1,y
2
t+1|xt+1)P(xt+1|xt)pit(xt,p
1
t ,p
2
t )
]
(62)
Note that in addition to the arguments on the left side of conditioning in (62), we only need pit
to evaluate the right hand side of (62).
We can now consider the common information based belief at time t+ 1,
pit+1(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1) = P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1|ct+1)
= P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1|ct, zt+1)
=
P(xt+1,p
1
t+1,p
2
t+1, zt+1|ct)
P(zt+1|ct)
(63)
The numerator and denominator of (63) are both marginals of the probability in (62). Using (62)
in (63), gives pit+1 as a function of pit, zt+1.
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